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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated Sections 78-2-2(4) (Supp. 1995), and 78-2a-3(2)(k) 
(Supp. 1995). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court properly refuse to terminate 
appellee's right to alimony based on the "residency" requirement 
of Utah Code Annotated Section 30-3-5(6) and the "cohabitation" 
clause of the Decree of Divorce? 
This issue is a mixed question of fact and law. Haddow 
v. Haddow. 707 P.2d 669, 671 (Utah 1985). Appellate courts give 
great deference to the trial court's finding of fact in divorce 
cases and do not overturn them unless they are clearly erroneous. 
Barnes v. Barnes, 857 P.2d 257, 259 (Utah App. 1993); see also 
Barber v. Barber, 792 P.2d 134, 136 (Utah App. 1990)(trial 
court's termination of temporary alimony affirmed on appeal 
because appellant failed to marshal relevant evidence and failed 
to show trial court's findings of fact to be clearly erroneous). 
Conclusions of law arising from factual findings are to be 
reviewed for correctness, and are given no special deference on 
appeal. Bingham v. Bingham, 872 P.2d 1065, 1067 (Utah App. 
1994); see also. Judge Norman H. Jackson, Utah Standards of 
Appellate Review, Utah Bar Journal, October 1994, at 24-27. 
2. Should this Court award appellee's costs and 
attorneys fees on appeal? 
This question does not involve issues raised at the 
trial level, and therefore there is no applicable standard of 
appellate review. If a trial court's order is affirmed on 
appeal, "costs shall be taxed against appellant unless otherwise 
2 
ordered.H Rule 34(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure (1995). 
Moreover, attorney fees on appeal may be granted in the 
discretion of the court in conformance with statute or rule. 
Mauahan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 156, 162 (Utah App. 1989)(citing 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3 (1984)). 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Utah Code Ann. Section 30-3-3(1) (1995) states: 
In any action filed under Title 30, 
chapter 3, 4, or 6, and in any action to 
establish an order of custody, visitation, 
child support, alimony, or division of 
property in a domestic case, the court may 
order a party to pay the costs, attorney 
fees, and witness fees, including expert 
witness fees, of the other party to enable 
the other party to prosecute or defend the 
action. The order may include provision for 
costs of the action. 
Utah Code Ann. Section 30-3-5(6) (1989) states: 
Any order of the court that a party pay 
alimony to a former spouse terminates upon 
establishment by the party paying alimony 
that the former spouse is residing with a 
person of the opposite sex. However, if it is 
further established by the person receiving 
alimony that that relationship or association 
is without any sexual contact, payment of 
alimony shall resume. 
Rule 34(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure (1995) 
states: 
Except as otherwise provided by law, if 
an appeal is dismissed, costs shall be taxed 
against the appellant unless otherwise agreed 
by the parties or ordered by the court; if a 
judgment or order is affirmed, costs shall be 
3 
taxed against appellant unless otherwise 
ordered; . . . . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A, Nature of the Case 
This appeal involves whether or not Appellant Robert L. 
Pendleton ("Appellant") is entitled to a termination of alimony 
payments to his former wife, Appellee Joyce A. Pendleton 
("Appellee"). Appellant filed his Petition for Termination of 
Alimony ("Petition") with the trial court on October 26, 1993. 
(R. 233) . Appellee filed her Answer to Petition for Termination 
of Alimony on January 19, 1994. (R. 247). The Honorable Judge 
Kenneth Rigtrup conducted a bench trial of the relevant issues on 
January 27, 1995. (R. 347). Although Judge Rigtrup discussed 
his findings from the bench (R. 445-50), he subsequently entered 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 281-85) and an Order 
dismissing Appellant's Petition for Termination of Alimony 
without prejudice. (R. 286-87). Judge Rigtrup concluded that 
the residency requirement under Utah Code Annotated Section 30-3-
5(6) contemplates more than just sexual relations, and requires 
some "duration, continuity, [and] some commitment to a shared, 
beneficial relationship." (R. 284, Conclusions of Law f^[ 4, 6). 
B. Statement of Facts 
The material facts in this case are generally not 
disputed. With the exception of some minor factual statements 
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made by Appellant for which there is no citation to the record, 
or the record citation does not support, Appellee generally 
accepts the "Statement of Facts" section contained on pages 5-9 
of Appellant's brief. For clarification and further development, 
Appellee sets forth the following facts, many of which have been 
completely ignored by Appellant. 
Appellant and Appellee were divorced on March 5, 1991. 
Paragraph 13 of the Decree of divorce states as follows regarding 
alimony: 
The plaintiff [Appellee] shall be awarded 
permanent alimony of Four Hundred and no/100 
Dollars ($400.00) a month. The defendant is 
ordered to pay alimony until the death of the 
plaintiff, the remarriage of the plaintiff, 
cohabitation of the plaintiff, or further 
order of this Court. 
(R. 176-77)(emphasis added). 
At trial, Appellant testified that he first became 
aware, in August of 1993, that Appellee had entered into a 
relationship with Bill Hunter ("Hunter"). (R. 431 L22-24). 
Based on suspected cohabitation, Appellant filed a Petition for 
Termination of Alimony in October 1993, ceased making alimony 
payments to Appellee, and began depositing said payments into a 
holding account. (R. 281-82, Findings of Fact ff 1-2). 
Appellee and Hunter commenced an eight-month sexual 
relationship in July of 1993 which continued through February of 
1994, during which time they spent most of their free time 
together. (R. 282, Findings of Fact ff 3, 5; R. 354 L12-25; R. 
5 
355 L18-22). Following a hiatus in their relationship, from 
August of 1994 through January of 1995, they established a fairly 
consistent pattern of sexual relations. (Id. }[ 4; R. 401 L3-5) . 
The trial court made the following additional findings 
of fact: 
6* During that eight-month period, Mr. 
Hunter and Ms. Pendleton ate a few meals 
together and shared some expenses; although 
it appears that Mr. Hunter bought most 
frequently when they went out. [R. 380 L19-
21] Mr. Hunter did eat meals free at Ms. 
Pendleton's house when she did fix meals. 
[R. 357 L18-19; R. 358 L23-25; R. 364 L15-17] 
7. Mr. Hunter had, on occasion, his 
clothes at the house of Ms. Pendleton and 
occasionally he had a briefcase there. [R. 
363 L3-11; R. 367 L16-20; R. 376 Ll-5] 
8. Ms. Pendleton did some token 
laundry for Mr. Hunter [R. 361 L22 - R. 3 62 
L23], and carried some of his dry cleaning to 
the cleaning establishment next door. Mr. 
Hunter reimbursed Mr. Pendleton for the dry 
cleaning that she had had done on his behalf. 
[R. 374 L20 - R. 375 L5; R. 380 L22 - R. 381 
L23] 
9. Mr. Hunter shaved, showered, and 
prepared himself for the day at her residence 
after having spent the night with Ms. 
Pendleton. [R. 396 L18 - R. 397 L5] 
10. It appears that Mr. Hunter rented 
an apartment approximately one (1) day prior 
to the filing of Defendant's petition; 
however, Mr. Hunter's wife and children were 
living in the Magna area. Some of his 
belongings were in that home, some of his 
things were in his vehicle, and some items 
were at Joyce Pendleton's. [R. 303 L6-13; R. 
305 L21-24; R. 312 L23 - R. 313 L7] 
11. Mr. Hunter did not use Ms. 
Pendleton's residence as a mailing address. 
[R. 373 L17-18; R. 338 L7-8] Mr. Hunter and 
Ms. Pendleton did not share any assets or any 
financial arrangements of any kind except to 
the extent that there was a nominal sharing 
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of a vehicle for transportation purposes. 
[R. 365 L7-18; R. 376 L6-23] 
12. Mr. Hunter and Ms. Pendleton did 
travel on several overnight trips and there 
was some sharing of expenses during these 
trips. [R. 359 L23 - R. 360 L13; R. 382 L12 
- R. 383 L4] 
13. The evidence is clear and 
unmistakable that Mr. Hunter made no 
significant or casual contribution to Ms. 
Pendleton for any household expenses. [R. 
364 L18-20; R. 374 L9-11; R. 378 L17-19; R. 
405 L22 - R. 406 L9] He made no mortgage 
payments or utility payments, and there was 
no commitment to do so. [R. 373 L19-21] 
(R. 283-84)(supporting citations to the record added). 
As of January 27, 1995, Appellee and Hunter had only 
seen each other 10-12 days within the last three months. Hunter 
testified that he had been in town more than that "taking care of 
other things," but he has business in town that he takes care of 
and then he has to leave. (R. 400 L14-19). In addition, from 
August 1994 to October 1994, Hunter was residing with his wife 
and dependent children in Montana. (R. 371 L9 - R. 372 L10; R. 
403 L4-9). From November 1994 to the time of trial in January of 
1995, Hunter spent less than five nights a month at Appellee's 
home. (R. 372 L23 - R. 373 L27) 
Although Appellee and Hunter had discussed getting 
married, they never set any dates. (R. 403 Ll-4; R. 339 L23-25). 
Hunter testified that they were not ready to commit because he 
had not settled things with his current wife. (R. 312 L2-5). 
The trial court found: Janet Hunter, Hunter's wife, lives in 
Montana with their dependent children; Hunter maintains a marital 
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relationship with Janet; and Hunter was not divorced from his 
wife, nor had he filed for divorce, (R. 283, Findings of Fact 5 
14; R. 378 L9-16)• 
Admittedly, Hunter had a key to Appellee's residence, 
which did give him access to her home, but he did not obtain this 
key until some time after the relationship began, and only after 
"some serious problems with [Appellee's] son and a lot of 
threats,11 (R. 358 L6-19; R. 386 L4-8) . These problems included 
a physical confrontation which involved Appellee's son's use of 
drugs. (R. 327 L23-24) . Moreover, Hunter testified that, when 
he was in town, he would go over to Appellee's house three to 
four times a day so that he could check on the house. (R. 386 
L10-13). Things were being stolen from the house every day. (R. 
388 L22-23; R. 406 L25 - R. 408 L3). Hunter testified that he 
would not just go over to relax, or take a nap, when Appellee was 
not there. (R. 318 L25 - R. 319 L14). Furthermore, Appellee had 
a key to Hunter's apartment in case she needed a place to go if 
she had any problems with her son. (R. 387 L15-19). 
Appellee had a key to Hunter's Oldsmobile that was 
stored at her house from July 1994 to December 1994, which she 
drove when she was sick and unable to walk the two blocks to 
work. (R. 376 L6-23; R. 369 L7-8; R. 376 L6 - R. 377 L7). 
Hunter testified that he spent at least 1-2 hours a day 
at his own apartment, which, considering his work in real estate 
and average daily travel of a hundred miles, was a considerable 
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amount of time to spend at that location. (R. 312 L13-21; R. 395 
L15 - 396 Lll). Hunter accompanied Appellee to a couple 
gatherings of her family, and family members were aware that they 
had a "serious relationship." (R. 340 L3-12; R. 314 L20 - R. 315 
L2) . 
Hunter never moved any furniture into Appellee's home, 
or bought any furniture for her. (R. 375 L6-11). In fact, at 
the time of trial, Hunter had no clothes or other personal 
property at Appellee's home. (R. 375 Lll-16). 
In addition, Hunter did not assist in any way with the 
cost of maintaining Appellee's home, nor did he perform any 
regular household duties in order to help maintain Appellee's 
home (with the exception of repairing a toilet that he broke 
himself). (R. 406 L5-19). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Appellee and Hunter did not "reside" together within 
the meaning of Utah's termination of alimony statute. Although 
their relationship was admittedly more than that of casual 
friends, Appellee and Hunter did not enter into a relationship 
consistent with marriage. Sexual contact alone, even over an 
extended period of time, is insufficient to establish the 
residency required under the statute. The facts supporting non-
residency in this case include, but are not limited to: Hunter's 
maintenance of a separate residence; his marriage to another 
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individual; and perhaps most importantly, the utter lack of any 
financial interdependence consistent with the traditional 
marriage relationship. 
Utah Supreme Court precedent supports the trial court's 
conclusion that Hunter was not residing with Appellee. In 
addition, appellate decisions from other jurisdictions also 
support the trial court's decision not to terminate alimony. The 
appellate decisions Appellant relies on are readily 
distinguishable from the instant case. 
Appellee's association with Hunter is the type of 
relationship the legislature contemplated would fall outside the 
termination of alimony statute. Utah's legislators envisioned 
the statute operating to terminate alimony when the receiving 
spouse was living with another individual under conditions 
consistent with marriage. They expressed concern that the 
statute not operate so as to terminate alimony based solely on 
post-marital sexual involvement with another. The statute was 
designed to allow for the termination of alimony when the 
receiving spouse entered into a continuous residency 
relationship, with accompanying financial interdependence. 
Finally, pursuant to established rule, statute, and 
case law precedent, Appellee should be awarded her costs and 
reasonable attorney fees incurred on appeal. The costs of 
defending this matter below, and now on appeal, have greatly 
increased Appellee's need for financial assistance. The trial 
10 
court's decision should be affirmed, and the case remanded on the 
narrow issue of determining the amount of Appellee's costs and 
attorney fees incurred on appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO 
TERMINATE ALIMONY. 
Based on the "residency" requirement of Utah Code 
Annotated Section 30-3-5(6), and the "cohabitation" clause of the 
Decree of Divorce, the trial court properly refused to terminate 
alimony. Paragraph 13 of the Decree of Divorce orders Appellant 
to pay Appellee alimony "until the death of the Plaintiff, the 
remarriage of the Plaintiff, cohabitation of the Plaintiff, or 
further order of this court." R. 176-77 (emphasis added). In 
addition, Section 30-3-5(6) (1989) of Utah Code Annotated states: 
Any order of the court that a party pay 
alimony to a former spouse terminates upon 
establishment by the party paying alimony 
that the former spouse is residing with a 
person of the opposite sex. However, if it is 
further established by the person receiving 
alimony that that relationship or association 
is without any sexual contact, payment of 
alimony shall resume. 
(Emphasis added).1 Appellee admits that her relationship with 
!This is the version of the termination of alimony statute 
that was in force at all relevant times below. The current 
version, which became effective May 1, 1995, is found at Utah 
Code Ann. § 30-3-5(9)(Supp. 1995) and states as follows: 
Any order of the court that a party pay 
alimony to a former spouse terminates upon 
establishment by the party paying alimony 
11 
Hunter included sexual contact, therefore the only issue on 
appeal is whether the "residency" requirement of the statute was 
satisfied. 
As discussed in each of the following subsections: (A) 
"Cohabitation" and "residency" both require an element of 
continuity and shared financial responsibilities; (B) Appellant 
has failed to establish that Appellee was "residing" with a 
person of the opposite sex; (C) Appellate decisions from other 
jurisdictions support a holding of non-residency in this case; 
and (D) the appellate decisions Appellant relies on are readily 
distinguishable from the instant case. Accordingly, the trial 
court properly dismissed Appellant's Petition for Termination of 
Alimony because he failed to establish that Appellee "resid[ed"| 
with a person of the opposite sex." 
A. "Cohabitation" and "Residency11 Both Require an 
Element of Continuity and Shared Financial 
Responsibilities. 
"Cohabitation" in the Decree of divorce is not a 
defined term. Construing the term "cohabitation" in a decree of 
divorce, the Utah Supreme Court in Haddow v. Haddow, 707 P.2d 
that the former spouse is cohabitating with 
another person. 
(Emphasis added). Representative Haymond, sponsor of House Bill 
36 which amended the statute, admitted "[t]he Bill does nothing 
to try to define [cohabitation]." 51st Legislature, Utah House 
of Representatives, Floor Debate, Tape No. 1, January 23, 1995, 
morning session. See also infra at 32-33 (discussing legislative 
history of this amendment). 
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669, 671 (Utah 1985) recognized, as did the trial court in that 
case, that the term "does not lend itself to a universal 
definition that is applicable in all settings." The Haddow court 
recognized the definition adopted by a majority of cases and 
statutes which follow the dictionary definition: "To live 
together as husband and wife." Id. (citing Black's Law 
Dictionary 236 (5th ed. 1979)2; Webster's Ninth New Collegiate 
Dictionary 257 (1984)).3 See also, Lynn D. Wardle et al., 
2The current edition of Black's Law Dictionary defines 
"cohabitation" as follows: 
To live together as husband and wife. The 
mutual assumption of those marital rights, 
duties and obligations which are usually 
manifested by married people, including but 
not necessarily dependent on sexual 
relations. 
Black's Law Dictionary 260 (6th ed. 1990)(emphasis 
added)(citations omitted). 
3Utah's Cohabitant Abuse Act defines the term "cohabitant" 
as follows: 
[A]n emancipated person pursuant to Section 
15-2-1 or a person who is 16 years of age or 
older who: 
(a) is or was a spouse of the other 
party; 
(b) is or was living as if a spouse of 
the other party: 
(c) is related by blood or marriage to 
the other party; 
(d) has one or more children in common 
with the other party; or 
(e) resides or has resided in the same 
residence as the other party. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-6-1(2)(Supp. 1995)(emphasis added). This 
definition of "cohabitant" includes elements of de facto marriage 
13 
Contemporary Family Law: Principles, Policy and Practice § 32:11 
at 57 (Vol. 3, 1988)("Cohabitation is defined variously, but 
generally means living together xon a resident, continuing and 
conjugal basis.'")(footnote omitted). 
In Haddow, the court held that there were two key 
elements to the term "cohabitation": "common residency and sexual 
contact evidencing a conjugal association." Id. at 672 (adopting 
within the term "cohabitation" the requirement of 
"residency")(emphasis added).4 The Court went on to state that 
"common residency means the sharing of a common abode that both 
parties consider their principal domicile for more than a 
temporary or brief period of time." Id. "Cohabitation is not a 
sojourn, nor a habit of visiting, nor even remaining with for a 
time; the term implies continuity." Id. at 673 (quoting Burke v. 
Burke, 340 P.2d 948, 950 (Or. 1959)). The court in Haddow also 
stated that the residency clause of the termination of alimony 
statute was drafted for the same purpose as the cohabitation 
clause in the decree of divorce. Id. 
and residency. 
4Appellant incorrectly asserts: "The continuing sexual 
aspect o[f] this relationship satisfies the requirement of 
Cohabitation7 as set forth in the Decree of Divorce." 
Appellants Brief at 10. Appellant's assertion completely 
ignores the elements of "common residency" and "mutual assumption 
of marital rights, duties and obligations usually manifested by 
married people" which are implicit in the term "cohabitation." 
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"Residency" is not a defined term in the termination of 
alimony statute, however, the Utah Supreme Court has defined the 
word "residing" as used in the statute as: "To dwell permanently 
or for a length of time; to have a settled abode for a time." 
Knuteson v. Knuteson, 619 P.2d 1387, 1389 (Utah 1980)(quoting 
Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary, 2nd. Edition). 
Both "cohabitation" and "residency" require permanency 
or continuity. Therefore, the application of either of these 
definitions to the facts of this case would be essentially 
identical.5 Appellant admitted at the trial court that for 
purposes of this case, "residing . . . is equivalent to 
cohabitation . . . ." R. 350 L24-25.6 Accordingly, it is 
appropriate to focus on the statutory requirement of "residency." 
B. Appellant has Failed to Establish that Appellee 
was "Residing" with a Person of the Opposite Sex, 
As set forth above, the Knuteson court defined the word 
"residing" as used in the statute as: "To dwell permanently or 
for a length of time; to have a settled abode for a time." 
5Judge Rigtrup concluded that the termination of alimony 
statute was controlling in this case, and did not address the 
"cohabitation" provision in the Decree of divorce. (R. 284, 
Conclusions of Law fl 1). Judge Rigtrup also stated that 
"residency contemplates some duration, some continuity, some 
commitment to a shared beneficial relationship. (R. 449 L14-16). 
Appellant's unsupported first-time argument on appeal, that 
proof of "residence" is less precise than that of "cohabitation" 
is not only incorrect, but is inconsistent with his own admission 
below. 
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Knuteson v. Knuteson, 619 P.2d 1387, 1389 (Utah 1980)(quoting 
Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary, 2nd, 
Edition)(emphasis added). Under this definition, Hunter never 
resided with Appellee. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Knuteson, affirmed Third 
District Judge Christine M. Durham's decision not to terminate 
the recipient spouse's alimony based on the termination of 
alimony statute. In Knuteson, the recipient spouse moved in with 
a neighbor for roughly two months and ten days, at least in part 
because of the grim financial situation brought about by her ex-
husband's non-payment of alimony. Although she candidly 
confessed to having sexual relations with the neighbor, Mr. 
Conder, the reviewing court refused to terminate her right to 
receive alimony because "the wording of the statute does not 
appear to cover a temporary stay at another's home." Id. at 
1389. Although admittedly somewhat distinguishable on its facts, 
the Knuteson decision supports the trial court's decision in this 
case. Like the temporary stay of the recipient spouse in 
Knuteson with her neighbor, Hunter's overnight visits were 
temporary and short term. There was clearly never any effort to 
make Appellee's home his permanent dwelling or settled abode. He 
never kept any belongings there, except occasionally a few 
articles of clothing and a briefcase. He maintained a separate 
residence, and never received any mail at Appellee's home. These 
facts, as well as those discussed below in the context of the 
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Haddow decision, demonstrate that Appellee and Hunter never 
resided together within the meaning of the termination of alimony 
statute. 
The Haddow decision, nearly identical on its facts, is 
a powerful precedent for this case. In Haddow, the Utah Supreme 
Court reversed the trial court's order that the ex-wife pay her 
former husband one-half of the equity in the home in which she 
was living pursuant to an equitable lien established in the 
divorce decree. The reviewing court held that the trial court 
had improperly construed the "cohabitation" language in the 
decree. Haddow, 707 P.2d at 670. The trial court found that the 
spouse spent most of her free time with her boyfriend, Mr. 
Hudson. Mr. Hudson had dinner at the spouse's house five or six 
times a week, and spent the night with her approximately once a 
week. Mr. Hudson would leave clothes at her home, which she 
would launder, and sometimes take to the dry cleaner. He would 
sometimes shower and change at her home. Mr. Hudson maintained a 
separate residence at his parent's home. He did use her home as 
a mailing address for a couple of bank accounts. There was no 
evidence that they shared any assets or had any joint financial 
accounts, projects, or liabilities. Mr. Hudson gave the spouse 
money to reimburse her for the food he ate, and took her car to 
be serviced at a car dealership where he worked. "Beyond that, 
Mr. Hudson made no financial or tangible contributions to 
appellant or to her household, nor did he share living expenses 
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with her in any sense." Id. at 67 0-71. The court found it 
significant that Mr. Hudson did not pay any of the receiving 
spouse's living expenses, or consistently share her assets. He 
did not contribute to the mortgage payment, the insurance on the 
house, or the utility bills. They rarely shared automobiles. 
Id. at 673-74. The court recognized Mr. Hudson's reimbursements 
for food and dry cleaning as evidence of their intent that each 
bear their own expenses. Id. at 674. In addition, the court was 
not critical of the fact that Mr. Hudson left a van parked at the 
receiving spouse's home for several months for storage purposes, 
rather than for the convenience of daily use. Mr. Hudson and the 
spouse had been dating each other exclusively for about fourteen 
months. They also took trips together to Hawaii and Elko, 
Nevada. Id. at 672. 
The facts of this case are nearly identical to those in 
Haddow. Like the receiving spouse and her boyfriend in Haddow, 
Appellee and Hunter spent much of their free time together, if 
Hunter was in town. Hunter would sometimes eat a meal at 
Appellee's home, and would spend the night at her home. Hunter 
would occasionally leave clothes and a briefcase at Appellee's 
home. Appellee did some token laundry for Hunter, and carried 
some of his laundry to the dry cleaner, for which she was later 
reimbursed by Hunter. Hunter would sometimes shower and change 
at Appellee's home. Unlike the boyfriend in Haddow, Hunter did 
not use Appellee's address to receive any of his mail, thus 
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making the case for non-residency even stronger here than in 
Haddow. In addition, the evidence is "clear and unmistakable" 
that Hunter and Appellee shared no financial obligations or 
expenses. R. 283. Hunter did not contribute toward the mortgage 
or utility payments. Like the boyfriend in Haddow, Hunter left a 
vehicle stored at Appellee's home for storage purposes, which 
Appellee used only on those occasions when she was sick and 
unable to walk the two blocks to work. This vehicle was clearly 
not intended for Appellee's daily use. Appellee and Hunter also 
took some short weekend trips together. As further indicia of 
his non-residence with Appellee, Hunter testified that he did not 
assist in any way with the cost of maintaining Appellee's home, 
nor did he perform any regular household duties in order to help 
maintain Appellee's home (with the exception of repairing a 
toilet that he broke himself). R. 406 L5-19. 
Based on these facts, the Haddow decision strongly 
supports the trial court's finding that Appellant failed to 
establish that Appellee was residing with Hunter. Obviously 
neither Appellee nor Hunter considered Appellee's home his 
principal residence, nor did his visits to the home rise to the 
level of continuity required under the statute. 
That Appellee and Hunter engaged in a fairly consistent 
pattern of sexual relations is not disputed. (R. 282, Findings 
of Fact f 4; R. 401 L3-5). Nevertheless, sex alone does not 
constitute "residency." See Haddow, 707 P.2d at 672-73 ("sexual 
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contact, even if extensive, does not alone constitute 
cohabitation"); Knight v, Knight, 500 So. 2d 1113, 1116 (Ala. 
Civ. App. 1986)("regular social and sexual companions is 
insufficient to prove cohabitation"). Appellant's emphasis on 
the duration of the sexual relationship is therefore misplaced. 
See Appellant's Brief at 16. Furthermore, the morality of their 
conduct is not at issue.7 The statute does not call for the 
termination of alimony solely upon proof that the recipient 
spouse has engaged in sexual relations, but rather requires a 
commitment to a shared relationship established by residency. 
The legislature certainly intended to strike a balance between 
the occasional sexual sojourn and common law marriage. See infra 
Argument II at 30-34 (discussing legislative history of 
termination of alimony statute). 
Appellant places much emphasis on Hunter's possession 
of a key to Appellee's home, which allegedly conferred upon him 
free access to the home, even when Appellee was not there. 
Admittedly, the Haddow court considered non-possession of a key 
7In amending the termination of alimony statute, legislators 
stated: 
It is not the intent of the Legislature that 
termination of alimony based on cohabitation 
with another person in accordance with 
Subsection 30-3-5(9), be interpreted in any 
way to condone such a relationship for any 
purpose. 
Utah Legislative Report 1995 at 36 ("legislative intent"). 
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in that case as evidence supporting non-residency. Id. at 673. 
In this case, however, Hunter was given a key so that he could, 
as a favor to Appellee, help check on the house because of the 
problems Appellee was having with her drug-abusing son. Hunter 
testified that he did not use the key, when Appellee was not 
there, to "pop a cool one", take a nap, or just relax. R. 318 
L25 - R. 319 L14. Hunter's possession of a key was to help him 
keep Appellee's home and its contents secure, and was not 
intended to grant him the access of a cohabitant. 
The Utah Supreme Court's decision in Wacker v. Wacker, 
668 P.2d 533 (Utah 1983) (per curiam), is also very persuasive. 
In Wacker, the trial court's refusal to terminate alimony 
pursuant to the statute was reversed on appeal. In that case, 
the recipient spouse lived with her boyfriend for approximately 
three years in a shared financial relationship that included 
sexual contact. There was evidence that the receiving spouse 
shared the rent, utility, and grocery bills. Id. at 534. The 
reviewing court held that the residency requirement of the 
statute had been satisfied under these circumstances, and alimony 
should therefore be terminated. The facts in the instant case 
obviously weigh in favor of the opposite result. The period of 
Appellee and Hunter's most significant contact is eight months, 
during which time, and all other times, they did not share any 
meaningful financial responsibilities or obligations. Other 
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appellate courts that have examined similar cases have come to 
the same conclusion. 
C. Appellate Decisions From Other Jurisdictions 
Support a Holding of Non-Residency in this Case, 
Numerous other jurisdictions have addressed the issue 
on appeal in this case, and support the conclusion that Hunter 
never resided with Appellee. 
Alabama has a statute, similar to Utah's, which 
provides for the termination of alimony "upon petition of a party 
to the decree and proof that the spouse receiving such alimony 
has remarried or that such spouse is living openly or cohabiting 
with a member of the opposite sex." Jones v. Jones, 387 So. 2d 
217, 218 (Ala. Civ. App.), cert, denied. Ex parte Jones, 387 So. 
2d 219 (Ala. 1980)(quoting Ala. Code § 30-2-55, 1975).8 
In Jones, the reviewing court affirmed the trial 
court's refusal to terminate alimony based on cohabitation. Id. 
at 219. The receiving spouse and her boyfriend had been dating 
and taking trips together over a period of five years. They 
engaged in sexual relations, and the boyfriend spent the night at 
the spouse's home on many occasions. They sometimes went to 
restaurants and bars together, and he would drive her car. He 
occasionally performed maintenance on the home. He did not have 
8Appellee's research reveals that Alabama has rendered the 
majority of appellate decisions dealing with the termination of 
alimony based on cohabitation. 
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a wardrobe, nor did he receive his mail at the spouse's home. He 
did not make any contribution towards the spouse's household 
expenses or groceries. Id. at 218. Based on these facts, the 
Jones court refused to reverse the trial court's decision that 
the former husband failed to meet his burden of proof that his 
ex-wife was cohabiting with a member of the opposite sex. Id.9 
The facts of this case are similar, most notably, the 
lack of any shared financial relationship. Jones supports a 
holding of no-residency in this case. Unlike the boyfriend in 
Jones, Hunter testified that he did not assist in any way with 
the cost of maintaining Appellee's home, nor did he perform any 
regular household duties in order to help maintain Appellee's 
home (with the exception of repairing a toilet that he broke 
himself). (R. 406 L5-19). The facts of this case are therefore 
actually even stronger than those in Jones. 
More recent Alabama appellate cases have affirmed the 
trial courts' decisions not to terminate alimony. For example, 
in Ayers v. Ayers, 643 So.2d 1375, 1376 (Ala. Civ. App.) cert, 
denied. Ex parte Ayers, 643 So. 2d 1377 (Ala. 1994), the court 
9The Alabama cases have unanimously adopted the abuse of 
discretion standard of review on the issue of cohabitation. The 
appellate court will not substitute its judgment for that of the 
trial court on the issue of cohabitation "unless [it] was clearly 
and palpably wrong." Jones, 387 So.2d at 218; see also Avers v. 
Ayers, 643 So. 2d 1375, 1377 (Ala. Civ. App. 1994)(question of 
cohabitation question of fact determined by trial court and will 
be upheld unless based upon all of the evidence and reasonable 
inferences, it is plainly and palpably wrong); Knight v. Knight, 
500 So. 2d 1113, 1115 (Ala. Civ. App. 1986)(same). 
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affirmed the decision below that the husband had not sufficiently 
proved cohabitation. The court employed the long-standing 
definition of cohabitation that had been developed under Alabama 
case law: "some permanency of relationship coupled with more than 
occasional sexual activity between the cohabitants," Id. at 
1377. "Factors suggesting permanency of relationship include 
occupation of the same dwelling and the sharing of household 
expenses." Id. In Ayers, the court upheld, with little 
discussion, the trial court's conclusion that "all of the 
evidence as to the relationship between the [wife] and [the 
alleged cohabitant] gave the Court a brief snapshot of a three-
year romantic friendship between them but did not meet the burden 
of proof sufficient to establish cohabitation as a matter of 
law." Ayers, 643 So. 2d at 1377. Appellee and Hunter's 
relationship was similar to a close romantic friendship. Simply 
put, they did not live together as husband and wife. 
The facts in the Alabama case of Knight v. Knight, 500 
So. 2d 1113 (Ala. Civ. App. 1986) are also similar to those in 
the instant case. In Knight, the court found that Mrs. Knight 
and her boyfriend, Mr. Cole, maintained separate residences. 
Neither contributed anything toward the other's debts, expenses 
or support. There was no evidence that they used each other's 
homes for mail, or any other purpose. They were regular social 
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companions and sexual lovers who intended to marry.10 Id. at 
1116. Based on these facts, the reviewing court reversed the 
trial court's termination of alimony, holding that there was no 
cohabitation. Id. Like the individuals in Knight, Appellee and 
Hunter maintained separate residences, did not contribute to one 
another's financial obligations, did not receive mail at each 
other's homes, and even discussed possible marriage, although no 
definite plans were ever made. Based on these facts, it is clear 
that Appellee and Hunter were not living together as husband and 
wife, and were therefore not "residing" together as contemplated 
by the termination of alimony statute. 
Other Alabama cases have held that the evidence was 
insufficient to prove cohabitation. See, e.g., Snipes v. Snipes, 
651 So. 2d 19, 21 (Ala. Civ. App. 1994)(trial court's refusal to 
terminate alimony affirmed); Wilcoxson v. Wilcoxson, 498 So. 2d 
1238 (Ala. Civ. App. 1986)(trial court's refusal to terminate 
alimony affirmed; talked about marriage but no definite plans; 
stored furniture at his house; saw each other quite frequently 
and occasional sexual intercourse); Hicks v. Hicks, 405 So. 2d 
l0The court also noted "[t]here is no evidence that either of 
them kept any clothing or other personal effects in the other's 
home, or that either had a key to the other's house." Id. at 
1116. Admittedly, there is evidence of these facts existing in 
this case, however, the clothing kept in Appellee's home was 
negligible, and Hunter's possession of a key was to allow him, as 
a favor, to watch over the home and its contents, rather than to 
grant him the free and unlimited access of a resident or 
cohabitant. 
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31, 33 (Ala. Civ. App. 1981)(trial court's termination of alimony 
reversed; evidence insufficient to support cohabitation; dated 
for two to three times per week for about a year but no evidence 
shared a common dwelling; no factors indicating permanency of 
relationship). 
In addition, other states have held, under similar 
circumstances, that alimony to the receiving spouse should not be 
terminated. See, e.g., Daniels v. Daniels, 374 S.E.2d 735 (Ga. 
1989)(trial court's termination of alimony pursuant to "live-in 
lover" statute reversed; evidence supported finding of periodic 
sexual encounters, but insufficient to show dwelled together 
continuously or openly); Reiter v. Reiter, 365 S.E.2d 826 (Ga. 
1988)(cohabitation necessary to modify alimony under "live-in 
lover" statute, "must go beyond periodic, physical interludes"); 
Matter of Marriage of Wessling, 747 P.2d 187 (Kan. App. 
1987)(trial court's refusal to terminate alimony pursuant to 
"cohabitation" clause in divorce settlement affirmed; kept 
separate residences; shared no living expenses; no jointly owned 
property); Miller v. Miller, 508 A.2d 550 (Pa. Super. 1986)(trial 
court's refusal to terminate alimony pursuant to "cohabitation" 
statute affirmed; maintained separate residences; not share 
incomes or expenses); see also Annotation, Divorced Woman's 
Subsequent Sexual Relations or misconduct as Warranting, Alone or 
With Other Circumstances, Modification of Alimony Decree, 98 
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A.L.R.3d 453 (1980)(discussing numerous cases dealing with 
modification of alimony based on cohabitation). 
In re Marriage of Gibson, 320 N.W.2d 822 (Iowa 1982), 
also considered the alleged cohabitants possession of a key to 
the receiving spouse's home. In Gibson, the trial court's 
decision to terminate alimony was reversed. Id. at 824. The 
receiving spouse had a boyfriend who stayed in the residence at 
least four times a week, and he often ate there. He would enjoy 
the use of the utilities and would occasionally bring clothes to 
the home. He maintained another residence where he kept his 
clothing and furniture, received his mail, and maintained his own 
telephone. Id. at 82 3. On these facts, the court held as 
follows: 
The time ("the recipient spouse's] 
boyfriend spent in the dwelling was 
extensive, easily sufficient to qualify as 
residence if time alone controlled. But the 
time was not spent as a resident. He 
maintained a separate residence and shared 
none of the expenses of this one. He did not 
even have a key or the freedom to enter it 
except when petitioner was present. In 
simple terms he did not live there. The 
trial court erred in finding [the recipient 
spouse] cohabited with a nonrelated male 
under the dissolution decree. 
Id. at 824. The facts of Gibson are very similar to this one, 
even though Hunter at some point acquired a key to Appellee's 
home. As previously discussed, his acquisition of a key was not 
intended to provide him with the unlimited access of a co-
resident. Furthermore, there is no question that, particularly 
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during their eight-month relationship, Hunter and Appellee spent 
a substantial amount of time together. As the Gibson court 
pointed out, however, time alone, even if extensive, is 
insufficient to establish residency. Residency under the statute 
surely contemplates more than the mere occupation of space over 
time. 
Like the boyfriend in Gibson, Hunter maintained a 
separate residence, where he received his mail, kept his clothes 
and other personal belongings, and maintained a telephone. Most 
importantly, he never shared in the expenses of maintaining 
Appellee7s home. In fact, he would even reimburse Appellee for 
his dry cleaning, on those occasions that she paid for it, thus, 
evidencing an intent to keep their financial responsibilities 
separate. On these facts, the trial court properly refused to 
terminate alimony. 
D. The Appellate Decisions Appellant Relies on are 
Readily Distinguishable from the Instant Case. 
Appellant has cited a number of cases in support of his 
position, including several cases from Alabama. Appellant fails 
to point out, however, that the standard of appellate review in 
Alabama is the clearly erroneous standard. See supra n.9. Each 
of these cases is therefore easily distinguishable. For 
instance, the underlying facts in McCluskey v. McCluskey, 528 So. 
2d 328 (Ala. Civ. App. 1988) are quite similar to this case, as 
discussed on pages 21-24 of Appellant's Brief. The McCluskey 
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court specifically recognized, however, that n[w]hile the trial 
court, in its discretion, could have reached a contrary decision 
under the evidence, we find no abuse of discretion." Id. at 331 
(emphasis added). In addition, the clear trend of the more 
recent cases in Alabama, is to hold that the evidence was 
insufficient to establish cohabitation, particularly when there 
was no evidence of sharing household expenses. See, e.g., Ayers, 
So. 2d at 1377; Snipes, 651 So. 2d at 21. 
The other cases cited by Appellant are also 
distinguishable on their facts, and actually, in this case, weigh 
in favor of continued alimony for failure to establish residency. 
See Daniels v. Daniels, 599 So. 2d 1208 (Ala. Civ. App. 
1992)(trial court decision terminating alimony affirmed; ex-wife 
moved in with boyfriend; parties lived together seven years; 
shared utility payments; traded housework for rent payments; car 
in both names); Kennedy v. Kennedy, 598 So. 2d 985 (Ala. Civ. 
App. 1992)(trial court's decision terminating alimony affirmed; 
parties lived together five years; shared responsibilities and 
expenses); Taylor v. Taylor, 550 So. 2d 996 (Ala. Civ. App. 
1989)(trial court's decision terminating alimony affirmed; moved 
his clothes into wife's house; received house key; paid utility 
bills, mortgage notes, and legal fees; contributed to household 
expenses and maintenance); In re Marriage of Frasco, 638 N.E.2d 
655 (111. App. 1994)(trial court's refusal to terminate alimony 
reversed; was traditional model of marriage; live together not 
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enough, need de facto husband and wife relationship; divided 
household responsibilities; took all meals together; created 
joint checking account, and commingled funds; put boyfriend's 
name on certificate of deposit); In re Marriage of Harvey, 466 
N.W.2d 916 (Iowa 1991)(trial court's termination of alimony 
affirmed; spent three to four nights a week together; sublet 
other apartment and told landlord giving it up; kept substantial 
part of clothes at wife's home; performed household duties; 
performed duties of a father to wife's children; kept two 
motorcycles and car at wife's home; free and unlimited access to 
wife's home; in short, boyfriend lived at wife's home). 
II. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OP UTAH'S 
TERMINATION OP ALIMONY STATUTE SUPPORTS 
A FINDING OF NON-RESIDENCY IN THIS CASE. 
Appellant erroneously relies on legislative history to 
support his position. As Appellant has alleged, Representative 
Pace, the sponsor of House Bill 188, stated during the debate in 
the Utah State House of Representatives, that the purpose of the 
new law was to establish a public policy that if a couple decides 
to "share the bed," then they must "share the board." 43rd 
Legislature, Utah House of Representatives, Floor Debate, Disc. 
No. 5, February 26, 1979; see also Appellant's Brief at 17. The 
legislature went on to acknowledge, however, as Appellant admits, 
that the purpose of the statute is "to allow courts to grant 
supporting spouses relief from alimony when the receiving spouse 
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choose to live with a person of the opposite sex xunder 
conditions consistent with marriage.'" Appellant's Brief at 17-
18 (quoting 43rd Legislature, Utah House of Representatives, 
Floor Debate, Disc. No. 5, February 26, 1979,u morning session). 
By "sharing the bed," legislators obviously contemplated the 
parties engaging in more than just sexual relations, but rather 
envisioned the sharing of possessions and responsibilities "under 
conditions consistent with marriage." 
This distinction was raised by Representative Rowe: 
This Bill has, in my opinion, a 
diametrically opposed purpose. We have 
alimony on one hand which is designed for the 
support of the spouse after or during 
separation and after divorce, and then we 
have living-in arrangement, on the other 
hand, related primarily to sex and sexual 
exchanges. I don't really see where the two 
really come together. 
But in the case of alimony, if a young 
woman or a man takes up a living-in 
arrangement with another person of the 
opposite sex, then that arrangement may be or 
may not be related to the financial support 
of that individual and alimony is to provide 
that support. If we attach alimony to an 
overnight stand or one afternoon or a week-
long episode or whatever, we may still not be 
providing the necessary support for that 
individual to have, to provide the basic 
living requirements of food, shelter, 
clothing, etc. 
We are very likely to put someone out on 
the street . . . without any support at all 
thereby becoming wards of the state and 
having to be supported by the state through 
nAppellant cites the date as 1989., however, this is clearly 
a typographical error since House Bill 188 was actually debated, 
adopted, and became law in 1979. 
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our tax bills. I don't think this is 
intended either. I think alimony is for 
support and we have to protect it. 
43rd Legislature, Utah House of Representatives, Floor Debate, 
Disc No. 6, February 26, 1979, morning session (emphasis added). 
Representative Rowe's statement emphasizes the legislature's 
concern that the statute not be used to terminate alimony based 
solely on the receiving spouse's post-marital sexual relationship 
with another. Legislators clearly envisioned the termination of 
alimony taking place upon a showing that the receiving spouse had 
entered into a shared financial relationship consistent with 
marriage. 
Senator Jeffs also stated as follows with respect to 
the residency requirement: 
This statute not only implements present 
law, namely that upon remarriage alimony 
stops, but also has a provision that in the 
event the spouse who is collecting alimony 
assumes residing, permanent residency, with 
another person as if they were their spouse, 
it [alimony] will terminate, even if they 
don't marry them. 
4 3rd Legislature, Utah Senate, Floor Debate, Disc. No. 3 06, March 
6, 1979, general session. Obviously, "as if they were their 
spouse" envisions more than just a sexual relationship, but 
includes continuous residency coupled with financial 
interdependence. 
There is also some useful information found in the 
legislative history of the 1995 amendment of the termination of 
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alimony statute which changed the language from "residing" to 
"cohabitating"• See supra, n.l. Senator Hillyard mentioned that 
the basis for changing the statute to require "cohabitating" 
instead of "residing" was to bring the language of the statute in 
line with the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Haddow. 51st 
Legislature, Utah Senate, Floor Debate, Tape No. 26, February 16, 
1995, general session. This renders Haddow an even more 
persuasive precedent for non-residency in this case. 
Furthermore, Representative Howard, in response to a 
question regarding the general intent behind the 1995 amendment, 
stated as follows: 
If someone really is cohabiting, they 
are living with another person in that 
companionship relationship that is at least 
commensurate with marriage, then alimony 
ought to stop. 
If they are in a substitute marriage 
relationship, alimony ought to end. 
51st Legislature, Utah House of Representatives, Floor Debate, 
Tape No. 1, January 23, 1995, morning session. 
The foregoing legislative history demonstrates that 
lawmakers did not intend to terminate alimony based solely on a 
receiving spouse's sexual involvement with another following 
marriage. Legislators contemplated continuous, permanent 
residency, including shared financial responsibilities. Appellee 
and Hunter's actions were not consistent with marriage, therefore 
there was no attempt to circumvent the statute by entering into a 
de facto marriage. In short, legislative history supports the 
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trial court's conclusion that Appellant failed to establish the 
residency required under the statute. 
III. APPELLEE SHOULD BE AWARDED HER COSTS AND 
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL. 
Appellee is without financial resources to meet her 
legal expenses. Moreover, Appellee's financial situation has 
deteriorated further due to the trial below and this appeal, and 
is therefore in need of financial assistance. Rule 34(a) of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure (1995) states in relevant part: 
"if a judgment or order is affirmed, costs shall be taxed against 
appellant unless otherwise ordered." Accordingly, if this Court 
affirms the decision of the trial court, Appellee should be 
awarded her costs incurred on appeal. 
In addition, Appellee should be awarded her reasonable 
attorneys7 fees incurred on appeal.12 Utah Code Annotated 
Section 30-3-3(1) (1995) allows a court to award costs and 
reasonable attorney fees incurred in defending an action relating 
to the payment of alimony. Pursuant to Section 30-3-3(1), this 
Court may order Appellant to pay costs and attorney fees incurred 
on appeal. Bagshaw v. Bacrshaw, 788 P.2d 1057, 1061-62 (Utah App. 
1990); Mauahan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 156, 162 (Utah App. 1989). 
12Although Appellee claimed reimbursement of her costs to 
defend this action below (R. 247) , the trial court ordered that 
each party in this case would bear their own costs and attorney 
fees through trial. (R. 285). This ruling is not contested by 
either party on appeal. 
34 
In an appeal of the trial court's refusal to terminate 
alimony, the Utah Supreme Court stated as follows: 
[Appellee] argues that inasmuch as the 
[appellant] was unwilling to abide by the 
trial court's judgment, and that she has been 
put to the necessity of defending this 
appeal, the [appellant] should have to bear 
the costs thereof, including reasonable 
attorney's fees for her counsel. We agree 
with the reasonableness and propriety of her 
request. Therefore, the case is remanded for 
the purpose of determining and awarding her 
such attorney's fees as the trial court finds 
to be reasonable and properly incurred on 
this appeal. 
Carter v. Carter. 584 P.2d 904, 906 (Utah 1978)(footnotes 
omitted). 
If the decision of the trial court is affirmed, this 
Court should remand the case to the trial court to determine the 
narrow issue of Appellee's reasonable attorney fees on appeal. 
See Riche v. Riche, 784 P.2d 465, 470 (Utah App. 1989)(remanding 
narrow issue of attorney fees on appeal to trial court). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing points and authorities, this 
Court should affirm Judge Rigtrup's refusal to terminate alimony. 
Appellant has clearly failed to establish that Appellee resided 
with Hunter. Sexual relations alone, do not satisfy the 
residency requirement of the termination of alimony statute. 
Appellate decisions from Utah and other jurisdictions, as well as 
relevant legislative history, strongly support non-residency in 
35 
this case. Furthermore, this Court should award Appellee's costs 
and reasonable attorney fees incurred in defending this appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this tf day of October, 1995. 
SCALLEY & READING 
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